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THE IMPACT OF THE COLD WAR ON THE ORIGINS 
AND EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMES
In this article I will be discussing not only the origins of the major international hu-
man rights regimes that emerged after the Second World War but also how the Cold 
War affected (or, more accurately, hindered) the implementation of those regimes. 
By the term “human rights,” I am referring simply to the basic political, social, and 
economic rights and freedoms to which all human beings are entitled.1 These inclu-
de, among others, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to free expression, 
the right to own property, and the right to equal treatment before the law.
The international human rights regimes that were organized after World War 
II were profoundly shaped by the war itself – a war that caused vastly greater de-
struction and misery than any other event in human history.2 The terrible bloodshed 
and upheavals of the war, culminating in Germany’s mass extermination of Jews 
in Eastern Europe, were on the minds of Western policymakers as they sought to 
forge postwar agreements that would guarantee basic rights and freedoms for all 
individuals. But the aftermath of the war had greatly complicated the prospects for 
the establishment of meaningful regimes on human rights. Three circumstances, in 
particular, are worth noting.
1 The phrasing I use here is similar to that in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For a discus-
sion of varying approaches to the concept of “human rights,” see: J. D onne l l y, Universal Human Rights in 
Theory and Practice, 2nd ed., Ithaca NY 2003.
2 D. B loxham, Genocide, the World Wars and the Unweaving of Europe, London 2008. For a lapidary 
overview of the war and the carnage it caused, see: G. L. We inbe rg, A World at Arms: A Global History of 
World War II, New York 2005.
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First, the Soviet Union, under Iosif Stalin, not only remained a tyrannical 
dictatorship itself but also extended its influence through Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, setting up a bloc of repressive Communist dictatorships in the region. In the 
countries under Soviet domination, human rights were systematically violated.
Second, the turmoil and human dislocation in Western Europe, and the ge-
neral leftward shift in European politics that resulted from the war, caused U.S. 
policymakers to fear that the Soviet Union would use subversion and possibly 
even military action to extend Communist influence into Western Europe. Later 
on, when Western Europe (with U.S. assistance) gradually recovered economically 
and came to enjoy a measure of prosperity, U.S. leaders were no longer as fearful 
of Soviet/Communist expansion into Western Europe. But they continued to worry 
that the Soviet Union would try to expand into East Asia and other parts of the so-
called Third World – fears that were greatly heightened by the Communist seizure 
of power in China in 1949 and the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950. As 
a result, the U.S. government was frequently willing to support authoritarian leaders 
in the Third World who would form a bulwark against Communist expansion.
The third circumstance that complicated the establishment of meaningful 
human rights regimes was the continued existence of European colonial empires. 
Britain, France, and Portugal, in particular, maintained sizable overseas colonies 
and initially were very reluctant to give them up. The difficult and often bloody 
process of decolonization in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s impeded the establish-
ment and implementation of human rights norms.3
This context, and the incipient Cold War, ensured that the negotiation and 
enforcement of human rights accords after World War II would not be easy. Let me 
illustrate this by looking at the origins and fate of three major human rights docu-
ments – the 1948 Genocide Convention, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, and the 1975 Helsinki Accords. All three agreements were, in some sense, 
products of the Cold War, and the implementation of all three was hindered by the 
Cold War.
Genocide convention
The term “genocide” was coined in the mid-1940s by Raphael Lemkin, a lawyer of 
Polish Jewish origin who escaped from Poland after the Nazis occupied the western 
part of the country in September 1939.4  Lemkin fled to Lithuania and then to Swe-
den before eventually reaching the United States in April 1941.  In November 1944 
3 On this issue, see: D. B. A be rne thy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas 
Empires, 1415–1980, New Haven 2000.
4 J. Coope r, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention, New York 2007. For 
a valuable, concise discussion of the term genocide and its evolution, see: M. K ramer, Genocide, [in:] New 
Dictionary of the History of Ideas, ed. M. C l ine  H orow i t z, New York 2005, Vol. 3, p. 909–913.
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he published a lengthy book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, which exhaustively 
documented the legal basis of the Nazis’ policies of mass extermination, deporta-
tions, and slave labor.5 The book is best remembered nowadays for Lemkin’s use 
of the new word “genocide.” He settled on that term after much deliberation and 
defined it as “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of 
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the 
groups themselves.”6
Because the word “genocide” became indelibly associated with the Nazi 
Holocaust, it promptly gained wide currency as the standard by which to judge 
human destructiveness – a standard that might never be equaled.  Lemkin himself, 
however, ardently believed that the term should not refer only to carnage and atro-
cities of the magnitude perpetrated by the Nazis against Jews. He wanted it to en-
compass all attempts to destroy cultural, ethnic, or political identities, regardless of 
whether the perpetrators were seeking to exterminate every member of the targeted 
group. His vision, however, was only partly realized.
Revelations at the end of World War II about the scale of the Holocaust aga-
inst the Jews spurred an effort within the newly-created United Nations (UN) to set 
up an international legal convention that would prohibit genocide and require sig-
natory governments to take all necessary steps to prevent or halt it. Although politi-
cal leaders were initially slow in moving on the issue, Lemkin did his best to keep 
the issue on the UN’s agenda.7 He repeatedly called on the world’s governments to 
establish a legal framework that would apply to all acts of genocide, not just those 
committed during interstate wars. In December 1946 the UN General Assembly 
unanimously adopted a resolution denouncing genocide as “the denial of the right 
of existence of entire human groups” and describing it as “contrary to moral law 
and to the spirit and aims of the United Nations.”8 The resolution also set up a com-
mittee to draft an international treaty that would formally outlaw genocide.
The result, after protracted and often arduous negotiations, was the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was 
approved by the UN General Assembly on a 55-to-0 vote in December 1948.9 The 
Genocide Convention was slated to enter into force after twenty of the fifty-five 
UN member-states that voted in favor of it submitted their formal instruments of 
ratification. 
5 R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals 
for Redress, Washington 1944.
6 Ibidem, p. 79.
7 J. Coope r, Raphael Lemkin... See also: S. P ow er, “A Problem from Hell”: America and the Age of 
Genocide, New York 2002, p. 111–187.
8 P. G ae t a, The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary, New York 2009, p. 107.
9 United Nations, Department of Public Information, “United Nations Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of Genocide,” December 1948, mimeograph, in Harvard Law School Library Depository.
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Although some signatories of the convention, notably the United States, took 
many years before they ratified it, ratification by the twentieth country was comple-
ted in October 1950, allowing the convention to take effect in January 1951.
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as “acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”10 This 
definition diverges from the definition in Lemkin’s original draft, which included 
political and social groups as well as national, ethnic, racial, and religious groups 
as potential targets of genocide.11 The reason that the political and social categories 
were omitted from the final version of the treaty is that Soviet delegates insisted on 
removing them – a change that Lemkin himself deeply regretted but did not pub-
licly denounce.12 The extent of Soviet pressure on this matter is now even clearer 
from evidence in the former Soviet archives as well as Lemkin’s own papers.13 The 
omission of political and social categories was crucial in that it essentially conver-
ted the Genocide Convention into a Soviet instrument against Germany.
The requirement that genocide is targeted against a specific cultural, ethnic, 
racial, or religious group omits some of the worst slaughters in the 20th century, 
including those perpetrated by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia in 1975-1979 – with 
a death toll as high as two million. By the same token, many of the atrocities com-
mitted in the Soviet Union under Stalin or in China under Mao Zedong would not 
be classed as genocide if the target had to be a specific ethnic or cultural group. 
Although Stalin did carry out mass deportations of nationalities in the 1930s and 
1940s that resulted in huge loss of life, most of his other violent abuses, affecting 
tens of millions of people, were not directed against ethnic groups per se.14 The 
same is true of most of the slaughters and systematic atrocities perpetrated in China 
under Mao. By excluding many of the worst abuses and crimes of the twentieth 
century, the requirement of a targeted cultural or ethnic group has arguably been 
the most controversial aspect of the Genocide Convention – an aspect that cannot 
be understood outside the Cold War context.
To help fill these crucial gaps, Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr have argu-
ed that the concept of “politicide” should supplement genocide. Politicide, as Harff 
and Gurr define it, refers to the killing of groups of people who are targeted not 
because of shared ethnic or communal traits, but because of “their hierarchical po-
sition or political opposition to the regime and dominant groups.”15 This is largely 
10 Ibidem. All citations here are from the text of the convention.
11 R. Lemkin, “Genocide: Proposed Changes in the United Nations Charter,” 1946, typescript, in 
Harvard Law School Library Depository.
12 L. Kupe r, Genocide: Its Political Use in the Twentieth Century, [in:] Genocide: An Anthropological 
Reader, ed. A. L. H in ton, Oxford 2002, p. 57.
13 See the declassified materials in Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial’no-Politicheskoi Istorii, Fond 82, 
Opis’ 1, Dela 211, 483.
14 The Black Book of Communism, ed. S. Cou r to i s, trans. and ed. M. K ramer, Cambridge MA 1999.
15 B. H a r f f, T. R. G ur r, Toward Empirical Theory of Genocides and Politicides: Identification and 
Measurement of Cases Since 1945, “International Studies Quarterly” 1988, Vol. 32, No. 3, p. 359–371.
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in line with Lemkin’s original intention. Similarly, Rudolph Rummel has suggested 
that the term “democide” could cover all intentional killing of unarmed civilians 
by governments. According to Rummel, democide includes the slaughter of cultu-
ral and ethnic groups, the massacring of politically marginal groups, and all other 
government-sponsored killing of unarmed civilians.16 Although neither “politicide” 
nor “democide” has been widely adopted by other scholars, the coinage of these 
terms highlights the continuing dissatisfaction with the definition of “genocide” in 
the Genocide Convention.
One other issue that has sparked occasional disagreement is whether geno-
cide must be deliberate from the start. This question has been most often raised in 
analyses of devastating famines like the one that occurred in southern regions of 
the Soviet Union in 1932–1933. The famine, which killed as many as four million 
Ukrainians, a million Russians, and a million Kazakhs, resulted from policies ad-
opted by Stalin to crush the Soviet peasantry and to force the collectivization of 
agriculture. Many scholars, such as Andrea Graziosi, Nicolas Werth, Terry Martin, 
and Michael Ellman, have argued that even if Stalin did not set out to kill so many 
people, the famines were the inevitable result of his policies.17 They also have po-
inted out that when Stalin learned that vast numbers of people were dying of star-
vation, he took steps to keep peasants from escaping the affected regions, thereby 
consigning them to certain death.
The Soviet famine has come up particularly often in discussions of genocide 
because of what some perceive as the deliberate targeting of Ukrainians. Although 
proportionally more Kazakhs than Ukrainians died in the Great Soviet Famine, the 
huge death toll from famine in Ukraine came against the backdrop of Stalin’s syste-
matic campaign against Ukrainian elites and Ukrainian culture. The combination 
of these destructive policies spurred Lemkin, among others, to regard the famine in 
Ukraine as a clear act of genocide under the Genocide Convention. Lemkin publis-
hed an article to this effect.18
Moreover, some analysts have argued that even when famines do not affect 
concentrated ethnic or cultural groups, the deaths may still amount to genocide. 
Among the examples cited by those who subscribe to this view are the terrible 
famines in China in the late 1950s that resulted from Mao’s Great Leap Forward 
policies. Although Mao undoubtedly did not foresee that the Great Leap Forward 
16 R. J. R ummel, Death by Government, New Brunswick NJ 1994.
17 A. Graz io s i, The Soviet 1931–1933 Famines and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a New Interpretation 
Possible, and What Would Its Consequences Be?, [in:] Hunger by Design: The Great Ukrainian Famine and Its 
Soviet Context, ed. H. Hryn, Cambridge MA 2009, p. 56–73; N. Wer th, A State against Its People: Violence, 
Repression, and Terror in the Soviet Union, [in:] The Black Book of Communism..., p. 187–204; T. M ar t i n, The 
Affirmative-Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, New York 2001, p. 273–310; M. E l l -
man, The Role of Leadership Perceptions and Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931–1934, “Europe-Asia Studies” 
2005, Vol. 57, No. 6, p. 823–841; M. E l lman, The Soviet Famine of 1932–1933 Reconsidered, “Europe-Asia 
Studies” 2008, Vol. 60, No. 4, p. 663–675.
18 R. Lemkin, Soviet Genocide in Ukraine, reproduced in “Journal of International Criminal Justice” 
2009, Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 123–130.
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would cause tens of millions of people to die of starvation, he failed to take any 
remedial action even when he became aware of the scale of the suffering. Hence, 
scholars such as Jean-Louis Margolin have argued that the death toll during the 
Great Leap Forward should be added to the millions of other victims whom Mao 
deliberately set out to kill.19
This latter controversy points to one aspect of the Genocide Convention that 
was directly affected by the Cold War. The Convention, in specifying the type of 
“acts” it encompasses, suggests that genocide can occur even if no one has carried 
out (or intends to carry out) “mass killings.” The aspect of the definition is largely 
in keeping with Lemkin’s own preference for a broad scope and his belief that the 
motives of the perpetrators are irrelevant. Although the convention stipulates that 
genocide is deliberate and purposeful (reflected in the phrase “intent to destroy”) 
and includes “conspiracy to commit genocide” and “incitement to commit genoci-
de” as well as the destruction itself, it does not require the signatories to determine 
why the perpetrators are seeking to wipe out the targeted group. Under the conven-
tion, genocide can occur irrespective of motive, in peacetime or in war.
Nonetheless, Cold War animosities prevented any cooperation between We-
stern countries and the Soviet Union to bring charges under the Genocide Conven-
tion against countries during the Cold War that would seem to have fallen within its 
scope, such as Burundi in the early 1970s.20 Thus, even though the Convention did 
lay groundwork for charges against various perpetrators during the Cold War, it re-
mained an ineffective document apart from its original application against Germa-
ny. In that sense, the Convention during the Cold War lived up to what Stalin had 
sought – an instrument to wield against Germany but one that would not threaten 
the Soviet Union or its allies.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was issued on 10 December 1948, the 
day after the Genocide Convention was signed. The UN Human Rights Commis-
sion that shaped this document in 1947 and 1948 under the chairmanship of Eleanor 
Roosevelt was frequently buffeted by the Cold War. Diplomats from many coun-
tries contributed to the final text.21 The original proposal for a statement concerning 
human rights was put forth by the Panamanian representative to the UN’s initial 
meeting in May 1945, Ricardo Alfaro, who believed that the statement should be 
incorporated into the UN Charter. Alfaro’s proposal was based on his contacts with 
19 J.-L. M argo l i n, China: A Long March into Night, [in:] The Black Book of Communism..., p. 468–557.
20 R. Lamarchand, The Burundi Genocide, [in:] A Century of Genocide: Critical Essays and Eyewit-
ness Accounts, eds. S. To t t en, W. S. P a r s ons, New York 2009, p. 321–338.
21 M. A. G lendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, New York 2001.
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American and British legal specialists and intellectuals who had been calling in re-
cent years for an international proclamation of basic human rights. The assembled 
leaders decided to form a Human Rights Commission that would be responsible 
for drafting an international declaration. Eighteen countries were represented on 
the Commission.
No sooner had the Commission begun its work than disagreements emerged 
about the type of statement to draft and the specific rights to mention. These disa-
greements were exacerbated by the deepening Cold War and by the inception of de-
colonization, including the mass bloodshed that ensued with the partition of India 
and Pakistan. The legal scholar John Humphrey, with assistance from René Cassin 
and numerous others, hammered out the basic text, which was then scrutinized by 
the Commission against the backdrop of Cold War tensions over Czechoslovakia, 
Berlin, and the Soviet-Yugoslav split. The impetus for including socioeconomic 
rights in the declaration came not from the Soviet bloc but from several Latin Ame-
rican countries.22 Later on, the Soviet Union and other Communist governments 
were fond of claiming (falsely) that they were champions of socioeconomic rights 
over civil and political rights, but in fact they were not the ones who promoted this 
concept in the Declaration. Instead, the Soviet-bloc countries wanted mainly to 
ensure that the Declaration would have no binding effect on them and would not 
infringe their sovereignty – a portent of why the Declaration subsequently proved 
to be of such limited effect.
In late September 1948, after the final text had been agreed in the Commis-
sion, the UN General Assembly directed one of its committees (the so-called Third 
Committee) to review the declaration carefully, article by article. Consideration of 
the document took far longer than initially anticipated, in part because of nume-
rous amendments submitted by the Soviet Union and a few other countries. Each 
amendment had to be debated and voted on.23 One of the Soviet Union’s proposed 
amendments is especially worth noting – a proposal to dilute the ban on torture 
by referring to the need to uphold local culture and customs. The Soviet proposal 
was supported by several Arab governments but was vigorously opposed by the 
delegate from the Philippines, backed by the United States, who argued that any 
weakening of the ban would open the way for the types of practices endorsed by the 
Nazis. Ultimately, the amendment was rejected, and torture is expressly prohibited 
in Article 5.
Another interesting illustration of how Cold War politics entered into the 
deliberations was the Soviet Union’s efforts to embarrass the United States on qu-
estions of racial equality. Article 2 of the Declaration affirms that “everyone is en-
titled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
22 J. Mor s ink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting, and Intent, Philadel-
phia 1999, p. 215–218. See also: M. G len  J ohns on, J. S ymon ides, The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights: A History of Its Creation and Implementation, 1948–1998, Paris 1998, p. 17–18.
23 J. M or s ink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights..., p. 188–257.
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of any kind, such as race.” The Soviet delegation sought to include provisions for 
penalties against countries that engaged in racial discrimination.24 Although this 
amendment was rebuffed, the embarrassment it inflicted on the United States was 
one of the factors that caused U.S. State Department officials to realize that an end 
to racial segregation in the United States would be crucial for U.S. foreign policy 
by eliminating an issue that could otherwise be exploited by the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, in subsequent years, State Department officials repeatedly testified before 
Congress that civil rights and an end to segregation would be highly beneficial for 
U.S. foreign policy.25
When the full UN General Assembly convened on 10 December 1948 to 
consider the Declaration, most of the disagreements had been overcome. Although 
the Soviet Union and its East European allies as well as Saudi Arabia and South 
Africa abstained on 7 of the 30 articles of the Declaration, 48 countries voted in 
favor of the full Declaration and none were opposed.
The non-binding nature of the Declaration ensured that it had no practical 
effect on the signatory countries that were most inclined to violate it, including 
the Soviet Union. By the time two follow-up Covenants were negotiated in the 
1960s – one the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
– the original goal of achieving binding commitments had fallen by the waysi-
de.26 The changing complexion of the UN, which was increasingly dominated by 
Third World countries that wanted to resist any infringements on their sovereignty 
(a goal shared by the Soviet bloc), did not permit the establishment of binding agre-
ements. Hence, the two Covenants, when they were adopted and opened for sig-
nature in December 1966, provided only for the submission of periodic reports on 
human rights performance. Earlier proposals for intrusive UN investigations into 
suspected violations, the submission of complaints by individuals and NGOs, and 
mandatory referral of violations to the World Court were all dropped. Even though 
an Optional Protocol to the ICCPR was drafted in 1976 to empower the ICCPR’s 
Human Rights Committee to receive complaints and review cases, the committee 
in practice has done little if anything to redress (or even try to deal with) some of 
the worst human rights abuses.
In a telling example of path-dependence, the Cold War tensions that had 
led to a non-binding Declaration in December 1948 created a framework that was 
hard to escape, setting the stage for the largely toothless covenants of 1966. Even 
though the two Covenants were adopted unanimously and, together with the Uni-
versal Declaration, became the three preeminent documents of international human 
24 Ibidem, p. 211–213.
25 M. L. D udz i ak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy, Princeton 
2000.
26 “International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” adopted December 1966 and entered into 
force March 1976; and “International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,” adopted December 
1966 and entered into force January 1976.
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rights, they did not enter into force until 1976 when 35 countries ratified them. 
Even when in force, however, they had little if any concrete effect on the signato-
ries’ behavior.
Helsinki accords
The Helsinki Final Act was a direct product of the Cold War, but ironically it pro-
ved to play at least a minor role in the end of the Cold War. The Helsinki accord, 
which was negotiated among 35 countries from 1973 to 1975, was originally sought 
by the Soviet Union to provide international codification of the postwar bounda-
ries in Europe. Western governments were willing to go along with it in return for 
Moscow’s agreement to enter into talks on limiting conventional forces in Europe 
– talks that ultimately led nowhere. The West European governments also sought 
to balance the territorial provisions of the Helsinki accords, which the Soviet Union 
favored, with specific provisions for human rights.27
The U.S. government joined the West European governments in seeking hu-
man rights provisions but was less enthusiastic about it.  Under the administrations 
of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, Henry Kissinger played a dominant role in 
U.S. foreign policy as both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. He 
believed that the United States should not give any significant emphasis to human 
rights. This was especially true in the early to mid-1970s with the advent of a dé-
tente between the United States and the Soviet Union.28 At a time of warmer rela-
tions between the two superpowers, Kissinger did not want the relationship to be 
jeopardized by “extraneous” considerations of human rights. U.S. diplomats during 
the Helsinki negotiations worked with their West European counterparts to arrange 
far-reaching provisions on human rights and human contacts, but they knew that 
Kissinger was relatively cynical about this part of Helsinki.
Nonetheless, the Helsinki Final Act, signed by the 35 leaders on 1 August 
1975, included numerous provisions regarding human rights in the first main part of 
the Act (the part titled “Questions Relating to Security in Europe”) – specifically, in 
Section VII of Part 1(a), titled “Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion, or [sic] Belief.” 
A later main part of the Act, titled “Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields,” 
included provisions for family contacts, family reunification, foreign travel, infor-
mation, and other areas. The provisions on human rights did not go beyond what 
was already in the Universal Declaration and the two International Covenants, but 
27 Among many useful accounts of the origins of the Helsinki accords are A. Romano, From Détente 
in Europe to European Détente: How the West Shaped the Helsinki CSCE, New York 2009; Origins of the Eu-
ropean Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75, eds. A. Wenge r, V. Mastny, Ch. N uen l i s t, 
New York 2008; O. Bange, G. N iedha r t, Helsinki 1975 and the Transformation of Europe, New York 2008.
28 M. C o t ey  Morgan, The United States and the Making of the Helsinki Final Act, [in:] Nixon in the 
World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977, eds. F. Logeva l l, A. P r e s ton, New York 2008, p. 173–192.
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they did establish a human rights framework specifically for East-West relations. At 
the time the Helsinki Accords were signed, the human rights provisions gained re-
latively little attention and were overshadowed by the controversy surrounding the 
Western governments’ seeming recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. 
President Ford’s decision to go to Helsinki to sign the accords came under strong 
protest, and many newspapers ran editorials criticizing the decision. The signing 
of the Helsinki Final Act even became a factor in the 1976 Presidential campaign. 
Ford’s main Republican rival, Ronald Reagan, denounced the Helsinki agreement 
as a “betrayal of American principles.” Ford defeated Reagan in the primaries, but 
the controversy weakened Ford’s standing.29
The Democratic candidate, Jimmy Carter, echoed much of Reagan’s criti-
cism, charging that Ford had “betrayed American values” with the “sell-out at Hel-
sinki.”30 But Carter also criticized the Ford administration for having given short 
shrift to human rights in U.S. foreign policy. After Carter narrowly defeated Ford 
in the November 1976 election and took office as president in January 1977, he 
elevated human rights to a central role in his administration’s foreign policy. Over 
time, he came to be a strong supporter of the Helsinki Final Act’s human rights 
provisions – the very agreement he had denounced Ford for signing.
The Soviet-bloc governments in 1975 hailed the Helsinki Final Act for its 
confirmation of the territorial status quo in Europe, and they made no mention of 
the human rights and human contacts provisions. Nonetheless, some human rights 
activists and dissidents in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, upon 
seeing the full published text, took the Final Act seriously. Starting with the for-
mation of the Moscow Helsinki Group in 1976 (an initiative of eleven leading 
dissidents, including Yurii Orlov, Lyudmila Alekseeva, Yelena Bonner, Anatolii 
Marchenko, and Anatolii Shcharanskii), an array of small informal groups arose 
in the Eastern bloc to monitor compliance with the human rights provisions of 
the Helsinki Final Act. The best known of these, in addition to the Helsinki Watch 
Groups, was Charta 77 in Czechoslovakia, a small group of dissidents who signed 
their landmark statement in January 1977.31
Because the Helsinki Final Act included provisions for follow-up meetings, 
these gave the Western governments (including the Carter administration) and the 
new human rights NGOs an opportunity to press the East-bloc governments on 
their violations of human rights. These meetings became an important source of 
international pressure.32
29 U.S. Presidents & Foreign Policy: From 1789 to the President, eds. C. C. H odge, C. J. N o lan, 
Santa Barbara 2007, p. 326–327.
30 Ibidem, p. 327.
31 See the invaluable three-volume collection edited by V. P r ečan, Charta 77: Dokumenty, 1977–1989, 
Prague, Ústav pro soudobé dějiny AV ČR, 2007, which consists of Charta 77 materials, declassified Czechoslovak 
State Security documents, informational tables, and commentaries.
32 On this point, see: S. B. S nyde r, The Helsinki Process, American Foreign Policy, and the End of 
the Cold War, Washington DC 2006.
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Nowadays, scholars and journalists often argue that the Helsinki Accords, 
through the rise of these informal human rights NGOs and the pressure brought to 
bear on the Communist governments, accelerated the end of the Cold War. Appea-
ling as that argument might be, it is too simplistic and indeed erroneous. Neither the 
Helsinki Final Act nor the initial follow-up meetings in Belgrade and Madrid nor the 
rise of Helsinki Watch Groups prevented the Soviet authorities from ruthlessly cra-
cking down on the Soviet dissident movement, essentially destroying it by 1982.33 
Similar crackdowns occurred in the other Warsaw Pact countries, largely putting an 
end to the human rights movements in all Communist states by the early 1980s.
That trend might well have intensified had it not been for a change of leader-
ship in Moscow in 1985 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s subsequent decision in 1988 to 
move in the direction of political liberalization and, a year later, toward democra-
tization. The fundamental change in the political climate in the USSR allowed hu-
man rights to emerge as a genuine factor in Soviet politics for the first time in histo-
ry. Even though the celebrated dissident Anatolii Marchenko died after a prolonged 
hunger strike in Chistopol Prison in December 1986, that same month marked the 
release of Andrei Sakharov. By 1989, with the formation of the new Congress of 
People’s Deputies, Sakharov won election to parliament and until his death in De-
cember 1989 was able to ensure that human rights considerations were accorded 
greater prominence, often against the better judgment of the government.
Gorbachev’s decision to move in this direction did not occur because he admi-
red the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group or other dissidents. Declassified transcripts 
of Soviet Politburo meetings from the mid- to late 1980s underscore Gorbachev’s 
contempt for Yelena Bonner and his loathing of the entire dissident movement.34 
Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s disdain for the human rights activists did not prevent 
him from gradually coming to embrace much of their agenda, if only reluctantly 
and grudgingly. By the end of the 1980s, the Helsinki Final Act’s human rights 
provisions were lending additional impetus to Gorbachev’s political reforms. The 
Soviet leader could argue that the USSR would have to live up to its international 
obligations if it wanted to reap the benefits of greater interaction with the West. 
Hence, some specific legislation was introduced in the new Soviet legislature (the 
Congress of People’s Deputies) to comply with the Helsinki Accords.35
In that sense, the Helsinki Final Act played a minor, though helpful, role in 
the Cold War’s end. For more than four decades after World War II, the Cold War 
stymied efforts to ensure greater compliance with human rights and prevented the 
33 Dokumenty Moskovskoi Khel’sinskoi Gruppy, 1976–1982, eds. D. I. Zuba rev, G. V. K uzovk in, 
Moscow 2006.
34 For some of the relevant documents, see: The KGB File of Andrei Sakharov, eds. J. Rub ens t e in, 
A. G r ibanov, New Haven 2006. Other materials are available in Fond 89 of the Russian State Archive of Recent 
History (Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii).
35 For an interesting, albeit self-serving, account of this dynamic, see: A. A damis h in, R. S ch i f t e r, 
Human Rights, Perestroika, and the End of the Cold War, Washington DC 2009. Adamishin was a senior official 
in the Soviet Foreign Ministry during the Gorbachev era.
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major human rights regimes from having any real bite. But the political dynamic 
in Moscow that led to the end of the Cold War elevated the importance of human 
rights in the Soviet Union and gave the issue a genuine place on the international 
agenda.
